Artificial Intelligence Affirmative

[Artificial Intelligence 2](#_Toc106626695)

[Introduction: Artificial Intelligence Affirmative 4](#_Toc106626696)

[Strategic Overview 5](#_Toc106626697)

[Being First Affirmative Speaker (1AC) 6](#_Toc106626698)

[Being Second Affirmative Speaker (2AC) 7](#_Toc106626699)

[Doing Rebuttal Speeches 8](#_Toc106626700)

[Key DEBATE Terms You may encounter 9](#_Toc106626701)

[Debate Terms 9](#_Toc106626702)

[Argument Glossary 10](#_Toc106626703)

[1AC - Lethal Autonomous Weapons 11](#_Toc106626704)

[Inherency 11](#_Toc106626705)

[Harm 12](#_Toc106626706)

[Plan Text 13](#_Toc106626707)

[Solvency 14](#_Toc106626708)

[Advantages 16](#_Toc106626709)

[Regulation 16](#_Toc106626710)

[China 17](#_Toc106626711)

[Russia 18](#_Toc106626712)

[2AC – Lethal Autonomous Weapons 19](#_Toc106626713)

[Plan Text, Restated: 19](#_Toc106626714)

[Case Extensions 20](#_Toc106626715)

[Solvency 20](#_Toc106626716)

[Regulation Adv Extensions 21](#_Toc106626717)

[China Advantage Extensions 22](#_Toc106626718)

[Russia Advantage Extensions 23](#_Toc106626719)

[Answers To 24](#_Toc106626720)

[A2 Russia DA 24](#_Toc106626721)

[A2 Imperialism DA 25](#_Toc106626722)

[A2 China DA 26](#_Toc106626723)

[AT Underdeveloped Technology 27](#_Toc106626724)

[Impact - Nuclear War 28](#_Toc106626725)

[Extra Cards 29](#_Toc106626726)

[Neg Answers (for the Neg) 31](#_Toc106626727)

[Impact - Nuclear War 31](#_Toc106626728)

# Artificial Intelligence

Graphical user interface, application

Description automatically generated

The goal of the affirmative is simple: Suggest a plan of action, show how it will work, and why it is a good idea. If the affirmative’s plan is a good idea at the end of the round, then you will win. The more you focus on the plan and why it is a bad idea, the more often you’ll win debates.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Speech Time | (Minutes) |
| 1st Affirmative Constructive (1AC) | 8 |
| 2nd Negative Speaker Questions 1st Affirmative Speaker | 3 |
| 1st Negative Constructive (1NC) | 8 |
| 1st Affirmative Speaker Questions 1stNegative Speaker | 3 |
| 2nd Affirmative Constructive (2AC) | 8 |
| 1st Negative Speaker Questions 2nd Affirmative Speaker | 3 |
| 2nd Negative Constructive (2NC) | 8 |
| 2nd Affirmative Speaker Questions 2nd Negative Speaker | 3 |
| 1st Negative Rebuttal (1NR) | 5 |
| 1st Affirmative Rebuttal (1AR) | 5 |
| 2nd Negative Rebuttal (Closing Statement) (2NR) | 5 |
| 2nd Affirmative Rebuttal (Closing Statement) (2AR) | 5 |

**Goals of each speech:**

1. **1AC:** Build your case: Inherency, The Plan, Solvency, and the Advantages.
2. **2AC/1AR:** Respond to the negative’s arguments and add new evidence if needed. You need to be winning at least Solvency and an Advantage after the 1AR to win the debate.
3. **2AR:** The second affirmative speaker should give a closing argument all about why the plan is a good idea. Answer the second negative rebuttal (2NR) and tell the judge why the affirmative team should win.

## Introduction: Artificial Intelligence Affirmative

Every year, the National Debate Association releases a *yearly topic* for students to debate. *The Policy Debate resolution for 2022-2023 is as follows:*

#### Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in one or more of the following areas: artificial intelligence, biotechnology, cybersecurity.

Breaking down the text of this topic gives you three topics for to center cases around: increasing security cooperation with NATO in **artificial intelligence**, **biotechnology**, and **cybersecurity**. This affirmative’s plan text is as follows:

#### The United States Federal Government should increase security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on artificial intelligence used for military purposes.

The Artificial Intelligence affirmative, aptly named, focuses on the artificial intelligence part of the resolution. By working with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to increase security cooperation specifically on “artificial intelligence used for military purposes, there are many implications on an international scale. As we live in a golden age for technology, technology like smart robots are now reality. However, advancements in tech like AI also changes the way wars are fought. This AFF focuses on **Lethal Autonomous Weapons**, military weapons that rely on AI to engage their targets without the need for human control.

The development of this technology is not as straightforward as its description. Currently, various nations are developing or have developed these “killer robots”. The notable nations of the bunch include the U.S., Russia, and China.

The United States is only one of many member nations under NATO, and each of them has their own progress in A.I. development, particularly for autonomous weapons. These weapons have the potential to completely change the international battlefield, and also put their creators at risk if left unchecked.

#### The affirmative argues that increasing security cooperation in various potential ways (establishing test centers, regulating AI development in industries, and standardizing member nations’ use of AI for war purposes) is important to combat a menagerie of potential risks (miscalculation, China/Russia dominaton, NATO miscommunication).

## Strategic Overview

Each Affirmative Case has four components. You must cover each piece to successfully debate as the affirmative.

* **Inherency:** What is the problem, and why isn’t it being fixed now? This usually identifies trends or specific barriers to the problem being fixed.
* **The Plan:** What is the affirmative going to do about it? This is a short description of action and should be written with care.
* **Solvency:** How will the plan work? Does the technology exist yet? Will it actually work?
* **Advantages:** What are the benefits of doing the plan, or the problems we can avoid by doing it? This is why we should care about the plan.

The affirmative has **three** *advantages* to choose from when building your 1AC/2AC. However, for your first few debate rounds, stick to **one** *advantage*. Despite your best efforts, you will only have enough time to read one. It’s also good practice, as you’ll need to understand what each of these *advantages* mean as you continue to develop your debate skills for this topic.

#### Advantages

**Regulation Advantage:** AI technology is developing exponentially faster by the day, and with new discoveries is a need to ensure that this technology is not being misused. This advantage advocates that our law/policies are in dire need of an update.

**China Advantage:** China is currently catching up to the U.S. in terms of developing Lethal Autonomous Weapons, especially when it comes to research and development. This advantage argues that a strong economic investment in AI development is key to providing a united front against foreign competitors like China.

**Russia Advantage:** Russia is another primary competitor for AI development. To prevent escalation and international conflict, this advantage argues that cooperation with NATO is essential to prevent the U.S. and its allies from struggling on interoperability, as well as to deter conflict and escalation with Russia.

When putting together your blocks, you’ll want to follow the structure you learned during flowing:

|  |
| --- |
| They say → <Insert argument>  That’s not true because → <Restate your argument or read a new card to answer their argument>  Prefer our argument because → <Explain why your argument is better> |

### Being First Affirmative Speaker (1AC)

**1st Affirmative Speaker:** Your job is to introduce the affirmative case in the 1AC, and to keep the affirmative case alive during the 1AR.

**Doing the Constructive Speech (1AC)**

The initial part of your case has already been “cut” or planned out for you. During the First Affirmative Constructive, also known as the first speech, your primary responsibility to is understand what exactly each part of the “Lethal Autonomous Weapons” 1AC means. In this speech, you’ll be reading out evidence, which may not seem very important but is incredibly necessary, as it establishes the debate for later speeches in the round. The 1AC process goes as such:

1. Arrange your evidence prior to the round. Make sure that you have your 1AC “foundation” as well as chosen one *Advantage* out of the three available to you that you’ll read.
2. When the round begins, set your timer and read out the “foundation” of your case (Inherency, Harm, Plan Text, Solvency). Reading evidence may look daunting at first, but you will learn how to interpret this evidence with your debate instructor.
3. Once you’ve read the foundation, move on and read out the *Advantage* you chose.
4. You will need to practice your reading speed so that you can finish reading out all of the evidence before your 8 minutes are complete.
5. After finishing the speech or the timer runs out, you will then enter **cross-examination** (3 mins), where a negative speaker will ask you a series of questions and you will do your best to answer them.

The final reading order for the 1AC is as follows:

Inherency → Harm → Plan Text → Solvency → Advantage(s)

You will need to focus on “extending” the following case components into your 1AR: The plan, solvency, and at least one advantage. All the evidence you read in your 1AC will now come into play in this speech!

Consider the following questions as the 1AC:

* Can you explain summarize your affirmative case in 2-3 sentences?
* Why is NATO the best option?
* What are the implications of working with NATO?
* What will happen if we don’t pass the affirmative plan?
* What do each of the *Advantages* mean? Can you explain them in detail?

### Being Second Affirmative Speaker (2AC)

**2nd Affirmative Speaker:** Your job is answer negative attacks in the 2AC, adding any evidence the affirmative might need, then to make a closing statement explaining why the affirmative team should win in the 2AR. This should focus on why the plan is a good idea and how the advantages are more important than the disadvantages.

**Doing the Constructive Speech (2AC)**

The initial part of your case has already been “cut” or planned out for you. During the Second Affirmative Constructive your primary responsibility to is not only “extend” the arguments made in the 1AC, but to provide a response to any arguments made by the 1st Negative Constructive. The first part of the 2AC involves reading “extensions”, or to continue an argument made by the 1st Affirmative Constructive, as it establishes the debate for later speeches in the round. At this point in the round, you’ll have chosen which *Advantage(s)* you’ll be using, and you will need to read out the extensions for each argument accordingly. Like the 1AC, the first part of your 2AC involves reading out evidence. However, it slightly differs in that you’ll need to prepare your speech as the 1NC is being read out. The 2AC process goes as such:

Evidence read by the 1AC doesn’t just go away. You’ll need to continue making these arguments in the 2AC.

1. Take notes about the 1NC’s main arguments as they are being made.
2. Arrange your evidence prior to the 2AC. Make sure that you have your 2AC “foundation” extensions, as well as the extensions for any *Advantages* read out from the 1AC.
3. Begin arranging any “Answers To” evidence for any arguments read out by the 1NC.
4. You will need to practice your reading speed so that you can finish reading out all of the evidence before your 8 minutes are complete.
5. After finishing the speech or the timer runs out, you will then enter **cross-examination** (3 mins), where a negative speaker will ask you a series of questions and you will do your best to answer them.

Consider the following questions as the 2AC:

* Can you explain summarize your affirmative case in 2-3 sentences?
* How can your plan solve for the problems you outlined?
* What is NATO? How is the US related to the organization?
* How can you rearrange the evidence in this file to make it easier for you to read?
* Can you explain what each of the cards mean on this file?

### Doing Rebuttal Speeches

Note: Advantages (an AFF argument) and Disadvantages (a NEG argument) are two separate arguments.

The negative team will respond to your arguments using “on case” responses. They’ll also present some of their own. These “off case” arguments are dangerous, and you must respond to them in order to win the debate.

There are two types of rebuttal arguments that you’ll encounter in this packet: Analytical arguments, which are arguments that rely on evidence previously introduced, and arguments supported by new evidence. **Please note that new evidence is only permitted when used to directly rebut your opponent’s argument. New *arguments* are not allowed in the rebuttal speeches.**

In the Novice Packet, there are three “off case” positions and this is how to answer them:

* **China Disadvantage**: There are two parts to responding to this disadvantage, depending on whether or not you’ve **read out the China Advantage during your 1AC/2AC**:
  + **If you read out the China Advantage in 1AC/2AC:** Extend your Bateman 2022 evidence and “impact turn” their argument. Explain that the impact of NATO economic collapse is actually prevented by the AFF plan. This spills over to NATO as an organization. Strengthening US policy on AI (which the AFF plan does) actually prevents NATO from experiencing strain as well.
  + In addition, explain that by strengthening NATO (which the plan does by working with the U.S.) actually protects the alliance from any potential threats made by China.
* **Russia Disadvantage**: Answering this DA has two parts, depending on whether or not you’ve **read out the Russia Advantage during your 1AC/2AC.**
  + **If you read out the Russia Advantage in 1AC/2AC:** Argue that there is “no impact”. Russia hasn’t actually used lethal autonomous weapons (L.A.W.’s) in Ukraine. This is important, because your Allen 2022 evidence states their definition of what L.A.W.’s is incorrect.
  + Using the same format as the one above, explain that by strengthening NATO (which the plan does by working with the U.S.) actually protects the alliance from any potential threats made by Russia.
* **Imperialism Disadvantage**: This argument is more technical but has two parts.
  + Argue that this argument is “not unique” to your affirmative, and that advancements in tech is inevitable.
  + And, argue that the U.S. is the “lesser of two evils”. Allowing a country like Russia to be the imperial power instead actually is much more worse.

## Key DEBATE Terms You may encounter

### Debate Terms

**“Passing the affirmative”** – when the judge votes for the affirmative, effectively “passing” your case as it were a real policy bill.

**“Net worse/Net better”** – an eloquent way to say “overall worse/overall better”.

**Status quo** – used to describe the current state of affairs, or the current situation the case is set in.

**Impact** – the reason a given argument is important. It is used to explain why an argument is important, and why the judge should vote for you.

**Extend (verb)** – to “extend” an argument made in the 1AC to later speeches.

**Extension (noun)** – a category of argument that are made past the 1AC. Used to continue an argument made from previous speeches.

**Link** – a card/evidence that “links” two arguments together. Without a link to the resolution, you risk being irrelevant to the debate.

**Link turn/Non unique** – an argument that the opponent’s claim is “non-unique”, or not unique to your case. It argues that the opposite of their “link” is true.

* For instance, if you claimed that pineapples are delicious, and your opponent argued that eating pineapples harms farm workers, then you could link turn, arguing that there are many negative factors affecting farm workers’ lives and eating pineapples is not one of them.

**Impact turn** – an argument that the opponent’s claim benefits your argument.

* For instance, if you claimed that pineapples are delicious and your opponent claimed that pineapple turns sweet foods sour, then you could impact turn their argument, arguing that you love sour foods.

### Argument Glossary

**NATO (noun)** – also known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, an international alliance of 30 countries, which includes the United States.

**Artificial Intelligence** (noun) – computer programs that utilize machine learning and are able to mimic human intelligence

**Regulation** (noun) – legal restrictions enforced by an authority

**Lethal autonomous weapons** (noun) – weaponized systems with the ability to operate without human oversight

**Interoperability (noun) –** interconnectedness of systems

**Autonomous** (adjective) – ability of a system (such as a weapons system) to work with or use the parts or equipment of another system

**Weaponization** (noun) – to adapt for use as a weapon of war

**Precedent** (noun) – something done or said that may serve as an example or rule to authorize or justify a subsequent act of the same or an analogous kind

**Ethical** (adjective) – involving or expressing moral approval or disapproval

**Intrinsic** (adjective) – belonging to the essential nature or constitution of a thing

**Technological Edge** (noun) – reaching an advantage in the technology sector

**Competitive Advantage** (noun) – when countries reach an edge over another country in a specified rivalry (ie military, economy, space exploration, etc.)

**Diplomacy** (noun) – the art and practice of conducting negotiations between nations

**Escalation** (noun) – causing something to rise, typically tensions between two states

**Data violations** (adjective) – a violation of what is considered legal or ethical surrounding data

**Hegemony** (noun) – the position of being the strongest and most powerful and therefore able to control others

**Undermine** (verb) – to undercut or circumvent

**Coalition** (noun) – cooperation between states for a shared goal

**Miscalculation** (noun) – inaccurate assessment

**Standardization** (noun) – to bring into conformity with a standard especially in order to assure consistency and regularity

**Mutually Beneficial** (noun) – when two parties benefit from the same action or goal

# 1AC - Lethal Autonomous Weapons

### Inherency

#### Many foreign militaries have already developed artificial intelligence for war. This takes the form of Lethal Autonomous Weapons, war machines that rely on AI that do not need manual control.

Michelson, 21 (Brian Michelson, Colonel (Retired) Brian M. Michelson is a Nonresident Senior Fellow with CEPA’s Transatlantic Defense Tech Initiative., 2-23-2021, accessed on 6-9-2022, CEPA, "Why NATO Needs Lethal Autonomous Weapon Standards | CEPA", <https://cepa.org/why-nato-needs-lethal-autonomous-weapon-standards/>)

While there is no agreed-upon international definition of lethal autonomous weapons systems, the U.S. Department of Defense defines them as “weapon system[s] that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.“ While these are not Schwarzenegger-style Terminators and still have a degree of human control over them, the technology enabling these systems is maturing rapidly, and military necessity will increasingly demand that these systems gain broader parameters of autonomous action. Yet despite the complexity of these systems and the inevitability of their proliferation, NATO does not currently have a common standard for their use or development. In fact, some NATO countries even have opposing views of how to handle them. In the emerging field of lethal autonomous weapons, establishing a common NATO standard for the development and use of autonomous weapons will help address the gap in capabilities among NATO member nations. By establishing these standards, nations can ensure that their defense expenditures on autonomous weapons will create systems that are interoperable, able to contribute to NATO’s capability, and can be employed within defensible ethical guidelines.

#### The status quo’s rapid development of AI-based weapons threatens the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, whose countries have fallen behind. The current standard for L.A.W development is outdated, posing a risk to US and NATO security.

Michelson, 21 (Brian Michelson, Colonel (Retired) Brian M. Michelson is a Nonresident Senior Fellow with CEPA’s Transatlantic Defense Tech Initiative., 2-23-2021, accessed on 6-9-2022, CEPA, "Why NATO Needs Lethal Autonomous Weapon Standards | CEPA", <https://cepa.org/why-nato-needs-lethal-autonomous-weapon-standards/>)

The rapid weaponization of artificial intelligence, “big data,” social media, robotics, and a host of other technologies presents a clear competitive challenge to NATO, an alliance with members that exist on a wide spectrum of military-technological capabilities. The future effectiveness of NATO will be driven in large part by how it handles these challenges from hobbling its ability both to act in unison and to prevail in a contest of wills. While there are numerous potential technology gaps, one that will likely only increase is partner nations’ ability and willingness to employ lethal autonomous weapon systems. These systems will inevitably grow more capable, and more necessary, in the coming decade.

### Harm

#### Several countries have already deployed these deadly technologies on the battlefield. Regulation is desperately needed.

**Trager and Luca 22** (Robert F. Trager and Laura M. Luca, an associate professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles, and a graduate student in political science at the University of California, Los Angeles, 5-11-2022, accessed on 6-8-2022, Foreign Policy, "Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Are Here—and We Need to Regulate Them", <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/11/killer-robots-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems-ukraine-libya-regulation/>)

Unlike traditional drones, these systems have the ability to navigate on their own, and some can select targets. Although a human controller can still decide whether or not to strike, such weapons are acquiring ever more autonomous capabilities. Now that militaries and paramilitaries worldwide have taken note, these technologies are poised to spread widely. The world today stands at the very moment before much more advanced versions of these technologies become ubiquitous. So far, at least Israel, Russia, South Korea, and Turkey have reportedly deployed weapons with autonomous capabilities—though whether this mode was active is disputed—and Australia, Britain, China, and the United States are investing heavily in developing LAWS with an ever-expanding range of sizes and capabilities. Once these technologies have spread widely, they will be difficult to control. The world thus urgently needs a new approach to LAWS. So far, the international community has done nothing more than agree that the issue needs to be discussed. But what it really needs to do is take a page from the nuclear playbook and establish a nonproliferation regime for LAWS.

### Plan Text

#### The United States Federal Government should increase security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on artificial intelligence used for military purposes.

### Solvency

#### The impact is competitive advantage – Maintaining US AI technology front guarantees US/NATO lead, and prevents NATO countries from falling behind.

**Franke, 21** (Ulrike Esther Franke, Dr. Ulrike Franke is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). She leads ECFR’s Technology and European Power initiative., Jan-1-2021, accessed on 6-9-2022, Jstor, "Artificial Divide: How Europe and America could", https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep29123.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aa5f05901d2537261e569c592ad151765&ab\_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1)

Transatlantic cooperation on lethal autonomous weapons, or other combat-related capabilities, does not, therefore, look promising. Europe and the US will need to choose the appropriate forum for AI cooperation based on its area of focus. Transatlantic cooperation on military AI might be best located within NATO. Members of the alliance have a long history of working together, and NATO already has dedicated units whose task is to ensure that all allies can cooperate and transform together. Given that military interoperability is vital to its functioning, NATO has no alternative but to address this issue, independent of other forums’ work. It would be advisable for NATO, and possibly the EU and its member states, to join the newly established, US-led AI partnership for defence. The current situation – in which the partnership includes only a few European countries and some of the United States’ other like-minded partners – is not constructive from a European viewpoint: Europeans should strive for Europe-wide harmonisation, not the creation of further differences. For cooperation on other areas of AI, such as sharing data or supporting research, other forums, including ad hoc alliances aimed at specific outcomes, may be the way forward. From a European standpoint, however, it would be advisable to try to include the EU as much as possible, so that European positions are not watered down or member states divided among themselves.

#### Passing the affirmative sets a precedent on an international scale and steers future AI development in a brighter direction.

**Miller, 21** (Amanda Miller, experienced with a demonstrated history of working in the US Air Force with a Top Secret/SCI clearance., 12-13-2021, accessed on 6-8-2022, Air Force Magazine, "NATO’s Plan to Grow Trust in Military AI - Air Force Magazine", https://www.airforcemag.com/natos-plan-to-grow-trust-in-military-ai/)

As a “pervasive technology,” AI will “have an impact on everything we do,” said van Weel. Setting aside “the killer robot discussion,” van Weel dismissed the notion of excluding AI from all military uses: “The idea that AI would not be used for defense purposes is like saying that the steam engine, when it was invented, could only be used for commercial purposes, or electricity would not be supplied to the military.” But being behind the private sector in AI development has left governments “in a situation where regulation comes after the broad use and misuse of technology,” van Weel said. “So we need to be early to the party and make sure that we understand new technologies, not to militarize them—no, but to understand the security and defense implications.” Van Weel said military uses of AI should be regulated, but “you don’t want to over-regulate if you don’t know that you can defend yourself within the regulations that you’re proposing.” He provided the example of drone swarms “that collectively, powered by AI, are able to follow an intrinsic pattern—for example, our water supply or one of our cities. So how do we defend against them?

# Advantages

## Regulation

#### At present, NATO currently does not have a coordinated position on AI development. This puts NATO military strength at risk.

**Stanley-Lockman, 21** (Zoe Stanley-Lockman, Zoe Stanley-Lockman is an Associate Research Fellow in the Military Transformations Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore., 5-26-2021, accessed on 6-14-2022, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, "Responsible and Ethical Military AI - Center for Security and Emerging Technology", <https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/responsible-and-ethical-military-ai/>)

At the same time, significant differences in ethical approaches to AI in defense could imperil political cohesion and undermine coalition success. Politically, alignment on ethics is important because shared values are at the foundation of U.S. alliances.3 This also trickles down to the operational level, where differing views on ethics could mean that allies field their systems with different legal authorizations and rules of engagement.4 If coalition partners deem each others’ capabilities to be based on different legal, ethical, and doctrinal assumptions, then forces may not be able to communicate and operate together.5 Further, if different ethical bases for capability development mean that some countries have higher thresholds for what they develop and contribute to coalition operations, then others may perceive them as not equally sharing risks to life.6 As such, political cohesion and policy considerations about ethics could directly influence operational effectiveness. In other words, failure to align allied perspectives on AI ethics in defense will inevitably undermine the ability of allied forces to understand each other and work together.7

#### Failing to regulate AI for member states undermines NATO coordination, making miscalculation and accidents more likely if left unchecked.

**Trabucco et al. 21** (Zoe Stanley-Lockman and Lena Trabucco, Zoe Stanley-Lockman is an Associate Research Fellow in the Military Transformations Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, Lena Trabucco is a dual degree candidate pursuing a PhD in political science at Northwestern University, 4-29-2021, accessed on 6-14-2022, Oxford Handbooks Online, "NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs", <https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69>)  
Even without being attacked, governability of AI in a NATO context also means understanding how AI-enabled and autonomous systems developed by the 30 Allies—and other partners—will interact with one another. NATO has expressed interest in governability as a principle of AI “to disengage or deactivate in case of unintended behavior,”85 which echoes the U.S. Department of Defense definition of governable AI.86 Disengaging adversaries is important to maintain de-escalation measures in conflict. For NATO, interoperability between systems also relates to governable AI because allies must also consider how the interactions between the 30 Allies’ own AI-enabled and autonomous systems may result in unintended or emergent behavior.87 This means that NATO has a responsibility to coordinate activities—be they technical exchanges, standardization efforts, or training and exercises—to build confidence that the systems perform as humans intend.88 Without this coordination, the lack of interoperability of allied systems could lead to accidents, and separately, the potential loss of operational effectiveness also presents vulnerabilities for adversaries to exploit.

## China

#### Maintaining NATO AI technology front by investing in mutually beneficial research guarantees US lead and facilitates defense against China, deterring conflict.

**Franke, 21** (Ulrike Esther Franke, Dr. Ulrike Franke is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). She leads ECFR’s Technology and European Power initiative., Jan-1-2021, accessed on 6-9-2022, Jstor, "Artificial Divide: How Europe and America could", https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep29123.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aa5f05901d2537261e569c592ad151765&ab\_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1)

In the US, there is growing concern over the possibility that China might become too strong an AI actor. The competition over global leadership between the US and China is intensifying, with technology in general, and AI in particular, as battlefields. The US fears that AI may give China a competitive edge. Therefore, countering China’s AI ambitions – as embodied in its attempts to dominate international technology standards bodies, for example – has become an important motive for the US to seek international cooperation. In this context, Joe Biden has proposed an “alliance of liberal democracies” to present an economic and political alternative to China. As noted, agreeing on shared goals and supporting measures will present some challenges. Beyond the specific themes of ethical AI and slowing Chinese progress in AI, however, there are other areas for transatlantic AI cooperation. Investing in these potentially less controversial areas may help create new platforms and lay important groundwork for greater cooperation. For example, the transatlantic allies should facilitate the exchange of knowledge and best practices on AI, and invest in mutually beneficial research, such as privacy-preserving machine learning. Some of these military capabilities – namely, lethal autonomous weapon systems, or “killer robots” – are among the most controversial uses of AI.

#### Investments in AI are necessary for technological edge - United States technology development is needed now to bolster AI front. NATO’s 2022 AI Strategy proves.

Konaev and Nurkin, 22 (Margarita Konaev and Tate Nurkin, Margarita Konaev is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Tate Nurkin is the founder of OTH Intelligence Group and a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Counci, 5-25-2022, accessed on 6-8-2022, Atlantic Council, "Eye to eye in AI: Developing artificial intelligence for national security and defense", <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/eye-to-eye-in-ai/>)

That’s why the alliance is publicizing a new plan by which it hopes its governments will get involved in AI development from the start, both for security reasons and to “bridge a gap of distrust” in the technology. Over the last several years, interest and investment in AI have gained momentum. This is especially true in the national security and defense community, as strategists, policymakers, and executives seek decisive advantages amid rising geostrategic competition and prepare for future operating environments characterized by complexity, uncertainty, and, most importantly, speed. AI is now at the center of military-technological competition between the United States and China, and both countries, as well as other militaries throughout the world, are already deploying AI-enabled systems with the goal of dominating the battlefield of the future. The United States cannot risk falling behind China— not in AI innovation, not in AI adoption, and not in the full-scale integration of AI across the national defense enterprise. Urgency is required in addressing the range of technical and bureaucratic processes, and cultural issues that have, to date, dampened the pace of AI adoption within the DoD. Systemic change is a slow, arduous process. But, delaying this transition risks the US military falling behind on exploiting the advantages AI promises to deliver, from operational speed to decision dominance. In the meantime, the following actions could help improve coordination with industry partners to accelerate the DoD’s AI adoption efforts.

## Russia

#### While Russia may be lagging behind now, increasing cooperation in AI prevents any future clash with Russia, fostering diplomacy.

**Laird, 20** (Burgess Laird, Burgess Laird is a Senior International Defense Researcher with the RAND Corporation and an adjunct instructor in the M.A. in Global Security Studies at Johns Hopkins University, 06-03-2020, accessed on 6-9-2022, Rand, "The Risks of Autonomous Weapons Systems for Crisis Stability and Conflict Escalation in Future U.S.-Russia Confrontations", https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/06/the-risks-of-autonomous-weapons-systems-for-crisis.html)

Nominally at least, Russia's vision regarding the aims of exploiting AI for military purposes are not dissimilar from those of the United States and China. It supports research (PDF) in a number of AI application areas; in just the past three years, the Kremlin has declared its intent to establish six new national initiatives dedicated to AI research and development, including the Advanced Research Foundation (ARF), Russia's analogue to the U.S. Defense Department's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). As recently as April 21, ARF's deputy director boasted to RIA Novosti that as a result of the foundation's research, “Living fighters will gradually begin to be replaced by their robotic 'brothers' who can act faster, more accurately and more selectively than people.” Despite what Putin's bold assertion might otherwise seem to suggest, Western experts generally agree that Russian AI development significantly lags behind that of the United States and China. However, in stark contrast to U.S. AWS development efforts, if only marginally less so than China's, Russia places great emphasis on the development of AI for information warfare aimed, as a recent comprehensive report by my RAND colleagues documents, at causing political and societal damage to the target state. As argued below, instead of seeking to gain military operational advantages by competing to match U.S. AWS developments, Russia is much more likely to emphasize and invest in two other military capability areas.

#### Failing to provide a solution to the AI arms race with Russia leads to escalation, with disastrous consequences.

**Piccone 18** (Ted Piccone – nonresident senior fellow in the Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings and the chief engagement officer at the World Justice Project, law degree from Columbia University, served eight years as a senior foreign policy advisor in the Clinton administration. <KEN> "How can international law regulate autonomous weapons?," Brookings. April 2018. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/04/10/how-can-international-law-regulate-autonomous-weapons/>)

The prospect of developing fully autonomous weapons is no longer a matter of science fiction and is already fueling a new global arms race. President Putin famously told Russian students last September that “whoever becomes the leader in this sphere [of artificial intelligence] will become the ruler of the world.” China is racing ahead with an announced pledge to invest $150 billion in the next few years to ensure it becomes the world’s leading “innovation centre for AI” by 2030.

# 2AC – Lethal Autonomous Weapons

### Plan Text, Restated:

#### The United States Federal Government should increase security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on artificial intelligence used for military purposes.

## Case Extensions

### Solvency

#### Extend Miller 21 - Our aff plan is incentivized by NATO’s current plans to work with US tech organizations. Passing the plan fortifies NATO’s defense even further.

**Miller, 21** (Amanda Miller, experienced with a demonstrated history of working in the US Air Force with a Top Secret/SCI clearance., 12-13-2021, accessed on 6-8-2022, Air Force Magazine, "NATO’s Plan to Grow Trust in Military AI - Air Force Magazine", https://www.airforcemag.com/natos-plan-to-grow-trust-in-military-ai/)

Well, we can’t, frankly, because you need AI in that case in order to be able to counter AI.” To engender confidence in the principles, NATO has also proposed a new initiative. “Principles are nice, but they need to be verifiable as well, and they need to be baked in from the moment of the first conception of an idea up until the delivery,” van Weel said. To that end, to verify new AI, NATO wants to create test centers, co-located with universities throughout the alliance. This includes “existing test centers with knowledge, where allies that are thinking about co-developing AI for use in the defense sector can come in and verify, with protocols, with certain standards that we’re setting, that this AI is actually verified,” van Weel said. “It’s not a world standard yet, but if the 30 nations, Western democracies, start out by shaping industry to adhere by these standards, then I feel that we are making an impact, at least in the development of AI and hopefully also in the larger world setting standards.”

### Regulation Adv Extensions

#### Placing regulations encourages standardization across NATO nations, which is beneficial and ensures systems are reliable.

**Christie et al. 21** (Zoe Stanley-Lockman and Edward H. Christie, Zoe Stanley-Lockman is an Innovation Officer in the Emerging Security Challenges Division in NATO’s International Staff, and focuses particularly on Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy., Edward Hunter Christie is the owner and founder of AI Policy Consulting and served as lead consultant to NATO in the preparation of NATO’s AI Strategy., 10-25-2021, accessed on 6-10-2022, Nato Review, "NATO Review - An Artificial Intelligence Strategy for NATO", <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/10/25/an-artificial-intelligence-strategy-for-nato/index.html>)

Having agreed to adopt these mutually reinforcing principles, the task now turns to translating them into principled action. As such, NATO’s role in operationalizing these principles will involve efforts that similarly tackle different aspects of the technology’s lifecycle. Building the principles of responsible use into the front end of AI development is important because, the later they are considered, the harder it may be to ensure they are upheld. Ensuring a full life-cycle approach also depends on multi-stakeholder engagement because responsibility is diffused amongst the policymakers, designers, developers, and testers, as well as operational end users that engage in AI development and use. For NATO, this is relevant because various entities play an active role in AI integration, and because the Alliance can encourage coherence with national AI developments. Regulation sends the message and standardizes AI development, while also preventing it from violation. For NATO, the common commitment to these principles has practical advantages as well, providing a coherent common basis for both NATO and Allies to design and develop AI applications while also supporting interoperability goals. As such, NATO can foster the necessary interlinkages between safety, security, responsible use, and interoperability. This can be seen across the principles. For instance, it is important to ensure that AI systems are adequately robust and reliable for their intended use, not only so that they can be expected to function in accordance with legal obligations, but also to mitigate the risks of the system’s defects or limitations being exploited by nefarious actors. Through the adoption of principles of responsible use, NATO and Allies are sending a deliberately public message to their domestic populations, to Allied forces, and to other states, reiterating the Alliance’s enduring values and commitments under international law. More than just an obligation, this democratic commitment is also a pre-condition for common policy bases among Allies – and for partnership with non-traditional innovators across the Alliance.

#### Extend Trabucco et al. 21: Ensuring AI is developed ethically and responsibly is key to maintaining the alliance’s strength and legitimacy.

**Trabucco et al. 21** (Zoe Stanley-Lockman and Lena Trabucco, Zoe Stanley-Lockman is an Associate Research Fellow in the Military Transformations Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, Lena Trabucco is a dual degree candidate pursuing a PhD in political science at Northwestern University, 4-29-2021, accessed on 6-14-2022, Oxford Handbooks Online, "NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs", <https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69>)

The political dimension of the Alliance rests on the bedrock of a shared commitment to the “principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law,” as enshrined in the foundational North Atlantic Treaty of 1949.60 Shared values are important for NATO operations because they help constitute their legitimacy. In addition to the North Atlantic Council exerting civilian oversight over NATO operations, legitimacy also includes respect for international legal principles including the core principles of international humanitarian law, or the laws of armed conflict, distinction, proportionality, and necessity. Without political oversight and legitimacy, NATO’s military power would be less effective at shaping norms and promoting stability in the international system. The introduction of AI means that NATO has the moral and strategic imperative to adopt technologies that confer legitimacy and responsible innovation.61 Acting on a shared commitment to democratic values is vital to the political cohesion of the NATO Alliance, just as much as it is a determinant of military effectiveness in a predictable security environment.

### China Advantage Extensions

#### Ignoring the plan gives China leeway to catch up. Increased investments in AI prevents US from falling behind to China, which the plan aims to solve.

**Bateman, 2022** (Jon Bateman, Jon Bateman is a senior fellow in the Cyber Policy Initiative of the Technology and International Affairs Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace., No Date, accessed on 6-10-2022, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "U.S.-China Technological “Decoupling”: A Strategy and Policy Framework", April 25 2022, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/04/25/u.s.-china-technological-decoupling-strategy-and-policy-framework-pub-86897>)

China’s foreign influence efforts have often focused closer to home, on targets such as Taiwan and Australia.3 Nevertheless, in 2021 the U.S. Intelligence Community assessed that “Beijing has been intensifying efforts to shape the political environment in the United States to promote its policy preferences, mold public discourse, pressure political figures whom Beijing believes oppose its interests, and muffle criticism of China on such issues as religious freedom and the suppression of democracy in Hong Kong.”4 According to the IC, China “considered but did not deploy influence efforts intended to change the outcome of the [2020] US presidential election.”5 Beijing apparently judged that the risks outweighed the benefits. This calculus may well change in the future, particularly if U.S.-China relations continue to deteriorate. Second, official U.S. policy goals remain dangerously vague and open-ended across the board. Washington must publicly clarify its vision for the global tech trade and set more achievable ambitions for countering techno-authoritarianism, maintaining a military edge over China, and preventing Chinese espionage, sabotage, and influence operations. These are all important U.S. interests, but none would currently justify broad-based technology controls. Even so, U.S. rhetoric and policy actions continue to suggest the possibility of a costly and quixotic expansion of China-oriented controls. Clearer, narrower public messaging by U.S. leaders would help to focus agencies on those problems they can realistically address with restrictive tools and reduce the motivation of China and others to seize control of the decoupling process.

### Russia Advantage Extensions

#### Extend Piccone 18 – A good offense is a best defense, and NATO cooperation ensures that the alliance remains vigilant to potential threats. Russia is weak now, and the plan prevents any risk of Russian threats.

**Piccone 18** (Ted Piccone – nonresident senior fellow in the Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings and the chief engagement officer at the World Justice Project, law degree from Columbia University, served eight years as a senior foreign policy advisor in the Clinton administration. <KEN> "How can international law regulate autonomous weapons?," Brookings. April 2018. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/04/10/how-can-international-law-regulate-autonomous-weapons/>)

The United States, still the largest incubator for AI technology, has identified defending its public-private “National Security Innovation Base (NSIB)” from intellectual property theft as a national security priority. Others suggest that a more measured, incremental approach under existing rules of international law should suffice to ensure humans remain in the decisionmaking loop of any use of these weapons, from design through deployment and operation.

# Answers To

## A2 Russia DA

#### No Impact: Russia has not actually used fully autonomous weapons in Ukraine. The plan is key to preventing it from being reality.

**Allen, 22** (Gregory C. Allen, Gregory C. Allen is the director of the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Governance Project and a senior fellow in the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)., 5-26-2022, accessed on 6-10-2022, Csis, "Russia Probably Has Not Used AI-Enabled Weapons in Ukraine, but That Could Change", <https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-probably-has-not-used-ai-enabled-weapons-ukraine-could-change>)

In March, WIRED ran a story with the headline “Russia's Killer Drone in Ukraine Raises Fears About AI in Warfare,” with the subtitle, “The maker of the lethal drone claims that it can identify targets using artificial intelligence.” The story focused on the KUB-BLA, a small kamikaze drone aircraft that smashes itself into enemy targets and detonates an onboard explosive. The KUB-BLA is made by ZALA Aero, a subsidiary of the Russian weapons manufacturer Kalashnikov (best known as the maker of the AK-47), which itself is partly owned by Rostec, a part of Russia’s government-owned defense-industrial complex. The WIRED story understandably attracted a lot of attention, but those who only read the sensational headline missed the article’s critical caveat: “It is unclear if the drone may have been operated in this [an AI-enabled autonomous] way in Ukraine.” Other outlets re-reported the WIRED story, but irresponsibly did so without the caveat. In sum, there is little reason to believe that Russia is using AI-enabled autonomous weapons in Ukraine, yet. That is the good news. The bad news is that, if Russia’s unlawful war in Ukraine drags on, Russia has the intent and likely has the means to deploy autonomous weapons, with or without advanced AI.

#### A good NATO defense prevents Russia offense - NATO is currently leading in AI technology and the plan fortifies NATO’s capabilities.

**Wodecki, 22** (Ben Wodecki, BJTC accredited tech journalist and assistant editor at AI Business, 6-21-2022, accessed on 6-13-2022, AI Business, "NATO at risk of losing AI innovation race to Russia, China - AI Business", https://aibusiness.com/document.asp?doc\_id=777260)

Its recommendations include AI standardization, encouraging and improving AI literacy and spurring private sector innovation. Such undertakings would allow NATO allies to better scale and deploy AI – and keep pace with rivals. “These new capabilities will revolutionize NATO’s military and strategic affairs, thus strengthening NATO’s ability to fulfill its essential core tasks of collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security,” CEPA’s Nicholas Nelson and Nico Luzum wrote. The pair cited AI projects being undertaken by adversaries, including China’s attempts to develop purported mind-controllable drones and AI assistants for fighter pilots. But NATO allies have their own capabilities – including U.S.-developed autonomous tanks and British-made systems that provide ground troops with information on the surrounding terrain. The think tank’s study suggests that at present, NATO is leading the AI race – but risks losing its competitive advantage to peer competitors “competitors if allies fail to leverage the private sector, coordinate implementation and engage with the public.” CEPA suggests that NATO allies should accelerate AI adoption and actively encourage private sector innovation. “Ultimately, we hope that these recommendations enable NATO allies to better innovate, scale, deploy, and integrate AI and autonomy-based technologies to form agile, system-wide solutions.

## A2 Imperialism DA

#### Non-Unique/Link Turn: Preventing US/NATO imperialism will not prevent other countries’ from succeeding them. AI development is inevitable.

Michelson, 21 (Brian Michelson, Colonel (Retired) Brian M. Michelson is a Nonresident Senior Fellow with CEPA’s Transatlantic Defense Tech Initiative., 2-23-2021, accessed on 6-9-2022, CEPA, "Why NATO Needs Lethal Autonomous Weapon Standards | CEPA", <https://cepa.org/why-nato-needs-lethal-autonomous-weapon-standards/>)

The rapid weaponization of artificial intelligence, “big data,” social media, robotics, and a host of other technologies presents a clear competitive challenge to NATO, an alliance with members that exist on a wide spectrum of military-technological capabilities. The future effectiveness of NATO will be driven in large part by how it handles these challenges from hobbling its ability both to act in unison and to prevail in a contest of wills. While there are numerous potential technology gaps, one that will likely only increase is partner nations’ ability and willingness to employ lethal autonomous weapon systems. These systems will inevitably grow more capable, and more necessary, in the coming decade.

#### And, any hope of breaking out of the NATO’s imperialist structures relies on allowing other nations like Russia to take over, which is net worse. Russia-Ukraine war proves.

**Hamid, 22** (Shadi Hamid, Shadi Hamid is a contributing writer at The Atlantic, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and assistant research professor of Islamic studies at Fuller Seminary. , 3-6-2022, accessed on 6-13-2022, No Publication Found, "Putin Proves There Are Worse Things Than American Power", https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/03/putin-kremlin-imperialism-ukraine-american-power/624180/)  
Russia’s unprovoked attack on a sovereign nation, in Europe no less, has put matters back in their proper framing. The question of whether the United States is a uniquely malevolent force in global politics has been resolved. In the span of a few days, skeptics of American power have gotten a taste of what a world where America grows weak and Russia grows strong looks like. Of course, there are still holdouts who insist on seeing the United States as the provocateur. In its only public statement on Ukraine, the Democratic Socialists of America condemned Russia’s invasion but also called for “the U.S. to withdraw from NATO and to end the imperialist expansionism that set the stage for this conflict.” This is an odd statement considering that Russia, rather than the United States, has been the world’s most unabashedly imperialist force for the past three decades. But many on the anti-imperialist left aren’t really anti-imperialist; they just have an instinctive aversion to American power. In any number of ways, Russia’s aggression has underscored why Biden was right and why authoritarians—and the authoritarian idea itself—are such a threat to peace and stability. Russia invaded Ukraine, a democracy, because of the recklessness and domination of one man, Vladimir Putin. The countries that have rallied most enthusiastically behind Ukraine have almost uniformly been democracies, chief among them the United States. America is lousy, disappointing, and maddeningly hypocritical in its conduct abroad, but the notion of any moral equivalence between the United States and Putin’s Russia has been rendered laughable. And if there is such a thing as a better world, then anti-imperialists may find themselves in the odd position of hoping and praying for the health and longevity of not just the West but of Western power.

## A2 China DA

#### Extend Bateman 2022 AND impact turn their disadvantage – Preventing the aff plan allows China to catch up, leading to the harms both sides outlined.

#### A good NATO defense prevents China offense - NATO is currently leading in AI technology and the plan fortifies NATO’s capabilities.

**Wodecki, 22** (Ben Wodecki, BJTC accredited tech journalist and assistant editor at AI Business, 6-21-2022, accessed on 6-13-2022, AI Business, "NATO at risk of losing AI innovation race to Russia, China - AI Business", https://aibusiness.com/document.asp?doc\_id=777260)

Its recommendations include AI standardization, encouraging and improving AI literacy and spurring private sector innovation. Such undertakings would allow NATO allies to better scale and deploy AI – and keep pace with rivals. “These new capabilities will revolutionize NATO’s military and strategic affairs, thus strengthening NATO’s ability to fulfill its essential core tasks of collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security,” CEPA’s Nicholas Nelson and Nico Luzum wrote. The pair cited AI projects being undertaken by adversaries, including China’s attempts to develop purported mind-controllable drones and AI assistants for fighter pilots. But NATO allies have their own capabilities – including U.S.-developed autonomous tanks and British-made systems that provide ground troops with information on the surrounding terrain. The think tank’s study suggests that at present, NATO is leading the AI race – but risks losing its competitive advantage to peer competitors “competitors if allies fail to leverage the private sector, coordinate implementation and engage with the public.” CEPA suggests that NATO allies should accelerate AI adoption and actively encourage private sector innovation. “Ultimately, we hope that these recommendations enable NATO allies to better innovate, scale, deploy, and integrate AI and autonomy-based technologies to form agile, system-wide solutions.

### AT Underdeveloped Technology

#### Industries want to follow ethical principles – they won’t use underdeveloped technologies because of escalation.

**Byrne et al. 22** (Matilda Byrne, Ryan Gariepy, Emilia Javorsky, Volker Lehmann, and Laura Nolan, 01-1-2022, accessed on 6-14-2022, Library.fes, "", http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/17215.pdf)

Further progress toward stigmatization of LAWS will require engaging with multiple stakeholders, including industry, academia and civil society. However, inclusion of a broad range of stakeholders should not distract from the onus of responsibility for action remaining on states. Expecting the private sector to establish and maintain voluntary guidelines or codes of conduct on meaningful human control is unrealistic, given that states are the customers of weapons contracts and stipulate their expectations to the private sector. In fact, technology companies themselves have stressed the need for clear guidelines from states to help engineers, designers and technology workers make moral, ethical, and legal judgements about the systems they build.11

## Impact - Nuclear War

#### Non-Unique: Increasing investment in AI isn’t the only avenue that leads to nuclear war and is not uniquely exacerbated by the AFF.

#### And, cross-apply Miller 21 – The aff plan ensures AI development does not go that path. Escalation is unlikely if military tech is controlled.

**Miller, 21** (Amanda Miller, experienced with a demonstrated history of working in the US Air Force with a Top Secret/SCI clearance., 12-13-2021, accessed on 6-8-2022, Air Force Magazine, "NATO’s Plan to Grow Trust in Military AI - Air Force Magazine", https://www.airforcemag.com/natos-plan-to-grow-trust-in-military-ai/)

As a “pervasive technology,” AI will “have an impact on everything we do,” said van Weel. Setting aside “the killer robot discussion,” van Weel dismissed the notion of excluding AI from all military uses: “The idea that AI would not be used for defense purposes is like saying that the steam engine, when it was invented, could only be used for commercial purposes, or electricity would not be supplied to the military.” But being behind the private sector in AI development has left governments “in a situation where regulation comes after the broad use and misuse of technology,” van Weel said. “So we need to be early to the party and make sure that we understand new technologies, not to militarize them—no, but to understand the security and defense implications.” Van Weel said military uses of AI should be regulated, but “you don’t want to over-regulate if you don’t know that you can defend yourself within the regulations that you’re proposing.” He provided the example of drone swarms “that collectively, powered by AI, are able to follow an intrinsic pattern—for example, our water supply or one of our cities. So how do we defend against them?

### Extra Cards

#### Many foreign militaries have already developed artificial intelligence for war. This takes the form of Lethal Autonomous Weapons, war machines that rely on AI that do not need manual control.

**Kessel 19** (Jonah M. Kessel, 12-13-2019, accessed on 6-8-2022, The New York Times, "Killer Robots Aren’t Regulated. Yet. (Published 2019)", <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/13/technology/autonomous-weapons-video.html>)

There are weapons that use artificial intelligence in active use today, including some that can search, select and engage targets on their own, attributes often associated with defining what constitutes a lethal autonomous weapon system (a.k.a. a killer robot). In his book “Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War,” the Army Ranger turned policy analyst Paul Scharre explained, “More than 30 nations already have defensive supervised autonomous weapons for situations in which the speed of engagement is too fast for humans to respond.” Perhaps the best known of these weapons is the Israel Aerospace Industries Harpy, an armed drone that can hang out high in the skies surveying large areas of land until it detects an enemy radar signal, at which point it crashes into the source of the radar, destroying both itself and the target. The weapon needs no specific target to be launched, and a human is not necessary to its lethal decision making. It has been sold to Chile, China, India, South Korea and Turkey, Mr. Scharre said, and the Chinese are reported to have reverse-engineered their own variant. Although current A.I. is relatively brittle, that isn’t stopping militaries from incorporating it into their robots. In his book, which was published in 2018, Mr. Scharre wrote that at least 16 countries had armed drones, adding that more than a dozen others were working on them.

**Franke, 21** (Ulrike Esther Franke, Dr. Ulrike Franke is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). She leads ECFR’s Technology and European Power initiative., Jan-1-2021, accessed on 6-9-2022, Jstor, "Artificial Divide: How Europe and America could", https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep29123.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aa5f05901d2537261e569c592ad151765&ab\_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1)

Calls for cooperation between the United States and Europe have become particularly regular and resonant: following last year’s US presidential election, it was reported that the European Commission planned to propose a “Transatlantic Trade and Technology Council”, which would set joint standards on new technologies. And, in September 2020, the US set up a group of like-minded countries “to provide values-based global leadership in defense for policies and approaches in adopting AI”, which included seven European states, in addition to countries such as Australia, Canada, and South Korea. In June 2020, the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence was founded to consider the responsible development of AI; it counts among its members the US, four European states, and the European Union.

**Marijan, 22** (Branka Marijan, Branka Marijan is a senior researcher at Project Ploughshares, where she leads research on the military and security implication of emerging technologies., 2-14-2022, accessed on 6-9-2022, Centre for International Governance Innovation, "Beyond Ukraine: AI and the Next US-Russia Confrontation", <https://www.cigionline.org/articles/beyond-ukraine-ai-and-the-next-us-russia-confrontation/>)

The economic outlook for Russia, which remains dependent on exports of oil and gas for much of its revenues, is grim at least in the short-term. COVID-19 forced Russia to agree to a deal with OPEC to significantly cut production and exports, which it initially rejected in March, and sent oil prices down in what is bound to reduce budget revenues and cause economic contraction. Russia is now forecast to experience a GDP contraction of 5.5. percent and an increase in unemployment from 2.5 million to 8 million workers this year. Moreover, continued dependence on exports of commodities whose prices Russia cannot control, depopulation (PDF), and a host of other structural factors indicates that the economic outlook for Russia will remain bleak in the longer term, too, in absence of deep reforms. As a result, for the foreseeable future, Russia's federal budget is likely to be constrained. If for no other reason than that, the Kremlin will be unlikely to respond to U.S. AWS advancements by substantially increasing investments in the area, at least in comparison to two other capabilities it is more likely to prioritize well ahead of AWS as discussed immediately below. But there is yet another reason. In brief, such symmetrical responses to capability differences have seldom been part of Russia's playbook in the post–Cold War era. In this respect, it is too early to identify just where Russia may be heading in terms of the character of AWS ground, air, or naval capabilities it is likely to field, let alone to discern any associated operational concepts. The time doing so is likely to prove time misspent. Instead, Moscow is much more likely to look to two other capability areas in search of comparative military operational advantage with respect to the United States and NATO.

First, the Kremlin can be counted upon to continue with its customary strategy of underscoring and even increasing its reliance upon nuclear weapons both for deterrence and possibly even warfighting, a cost-effective strategy, comparatively speaking, that Vasily Kashin and Michael Raska economically refer to as “countering the Third Offset Strategy with the First Offset Strategy (PDF).” In this regard, Putin's unveiling of the five nuclear “superweapons” in his March 2018 nationally televised speech to the Russian Federal Assembly can be seen as exhibit one of this strategy. Still, Moscow's continued reliance on nuclear weapons by no means suggests that it will be willing to cede leadership in emerging disruptive technologies entirely to the United States.

#### Their Madnick 2022 evidence only concerns the use of nuclear devices and cyberwarfare, not autonomous weapons – This has no correlation to the affirmative plan whatsoever.

Madnick, 2022, (Stuart, Professor of Engineering Systems in the MIT School of Engineering, and Director of Cybersecurity at MIT Sloan (CAMS): the Interdisciplinary Consortium for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.), “What Russia’s Ongoing Cyber Attacks in Ukraine Suggest About the Future of Cyber Warfare”. Harvard Business Review. 03/07. https://hbr.org/2022/03/what-russias-ongoing-cyberattacks-in-ukraine-suggest-about-the-future-of-cyber-warfare

Between 1946 and 1958, the Bikini Atoll, in the North Pacific Ocean, was used as a testing ground for 23 new nuclear devices that were detonated at various spots on, above, or beneath it. The point of the tests was primarily to understand (and, in many cases, show off) how these new weapons really worked — and what they were capable of. The era of nuclear testing may now be over, but the age of cyber warfare is just beginning. And for Russia, the war with Ukraine has been likely serving as a live testing ground for its next generation of cyber weapons. Countries and companies watching this latest chapter unfold should remember this: The online front of the war can — and has — jumped borders.

# Neg Answers (for the Neg)

## Impact - Nuclear War

1. **Overinvestment in AI can lead to overdependence, leading to fatally unintentional consequences such as nuclear war.**

**Kallenborn, 22** (Zachary Kallenborn, Zachary Kallenborn is a research affiliate with the Unconventional Weapons and Technology Division of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), a policy fellow at the Schar School of Policy and Government, a US Army Training and Doctrine Command “Mad Scientist,” and national security consultant, 2-1-2022, accessed on 6-13-2022, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, "Giving an AI control of nuclear weapons: What could possibly go wrong? - Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists", <https://thebulletin.org/2022/02/giving-an-ai-control-of-nuclear-weapons-what-could-possibly-go-wrong/>)

How autonomous nuclear weapons could go wrong. The huge problem with autonomous nuclear weapons, and really all autonomous weapons, is error. Machine learning-based artificial intelligences—the current AI vogue—rely on large amounts of data to perform a task. Google’s AlphaGo program beat the world’s greatest human go players, experts at the ancient Chinese game that’s even more complex than chess, by playing millions of games against itself to learn the game. For a constrained game like Go, that worked well. But in the real world, data may be biased or incomplete in all sorts of ways. For example, one hiring algorithm concluded being named Jared and playing high school lacrosse was the most reliable indicator of job performance, probably because it picked up on human biases in the data.

In a nuclear weapons context, a government may have little data about adversary military platforms; existing data may be structurally biased, by, for example, relying on satellite imagery; or data may not account for obvious, expected variations such as imagery in taken during foggy, rainy, or overcast weather.

#### And, wars utilizing autonomous weapons are more likely to escalate due to preemptive attacks.

**Laird, 16** (Burgess Laird, Burgess Laird is a Senior International Defense Researcher with the RAND Corporation and an adjunct instructor in the M.A. in Global Security Studies at Johns Hopkins University, 12-8-2016, accessed on 6-9-2022, Rand, "The Risks of Autonomous Weapons Systems for Crisis Stability and Conflict Escalation in Future U.S.-Russia Confrontations", https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/06/the-risks-of-autonomous-weapons-systems-for-crisis.html)

First, a state facing an adversary with AWS capable of making decisions at machine speeds is likely to fear the threat of sudden and potent attack, a threat that would compress the amount of time for strategic decisionmaking. The posturing of AWS during a crisis would likely create fears that one's forces could suffer significant, if not decisive, strikes. These fears in turn could translate into pressures to strike first—to preempt—for fear of having to strike second from a greatly weakened position. Similarly, within conflict, the fear of losing at machine speeds would be likely to cause a state to escalate the intensity of the conflict possibly even to the level of nuclear use.